• 204 Citations
  • 7 h-Index
19992018
If you made any changes in Pure these will be visible here soon.

Personal profile

Education/Academic qualification

Northwestern University

External positions

Fingerprint Fingerprint is based on mining the text of the person's scientific documents to create an index of weighted terms, which defines the key subjects of each individual researcher.

Second-price auction Business & Economics
Participation costs Business & Economics
Seller Business & Economics
Participation Business & Economics
Evolution of preferences Business & Economics
Nash equilibrium Business & Economics
Fitness Business & Economics
Economics Business & Economics

Research Output 1999 2018

  • 204 Citations
  • 7 h-Index
  • 10 Article

Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs

Cao, X., Tan, G., Tian, G. & Yilankaya, O., Mar 1 2018, In : Economic Theory. 65, 2, p. 231-249 19 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation

Celik, G. & Yilankaya, O., Sep 1 2017, In : International Journal of Industrial Organization. 54, p. 148-174 27 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Distribution functions
Participation
Second-price auction
Resale

Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation

Celik, G. & Yilankaya, O., 2009, In : B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 9, 1, 24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Participation
Optimal auction
Seller
Independent private values
Asymmetric equilibria
79 Citations (Scopus)

Evolution of preferences

Dekel, E., Ely, J. C. & Yilankaya, O., Jul 2007, In : Review of Economic Studies. 74, 3, p. 685-704 20 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Evolution of preferences
Observability
Pure strategies
Nash equilibrium
Fitness
6 Citations (Scopus)

Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs

Tan, G. & Yilankaya, O., May 2007, In : Games and Economic Behavior. 59, 2, p. 383-396 14 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Participation costs
Second-price auction
Efficient mechanisms
Cartel
Seller