A New Source of Data About Singular Thought

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in at least three ways: they have invoked wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas, they have elicited direct intuitions about which thoughts are singular, and they have subjected propositional attitude reports to tests such as Russellian substitution and Quinean exportation. In these ways, however, we haven't yet been able to tell what it takes to have singular thoughts, nor have we been able to tell which of our thoughts they are. I propose, therefore, a methodological contribution, a new source of data about singular thought. We can tell whether a thought is singular if we ask what we can coherently deny at the same time at which we agree with the thought. When we agree with a thought that is general, we cannot coherently deny about the thought's subject a certain description, the one that occurs in the thought's subject position. To show how to use this new data source, I develop a linguistic method for testing whether a speaker expresses a singular or a general thought.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1159-1172
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophia
Volume41
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Singular Thought
Thought
Substitution
Intuition
Propositional Attitudes
Philosopher
Testing

Keywords

  • Agreement
  • Disagreement
  • Methodology
  • Psychosemantics
  • Singular thought

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. / Capraru, Mihnea D I.

In: Philosophia, Vol. 41, No. 4, 2013, p. 1159-1172.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Capraru, Mihnea D I. / A New Source of Data About Singular Thought. In: Philosophia. 2013 ; Vol. 41, No. 4. pp. 1159-1172.
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