Abstract
In 2007, the Russian government instituted quotas for immigrant work permits that were consistently lower than actual labour demand. While low quotas are politically popular on the mass level, this article argues that low quotas are also a tool of the government to distribute patronage resources to regional political and economic elites. For several years after quotas were instituted, they remained quite controversial, and during this time decisions about them were firmly in the hands of Vladimir Putin, first as president and then as prime minister, giving him a powerful tool to control the immigration process and labour market manually. While this type of manual control is effective in the short term to manage contentious policy arenas, it suffers a number of possible long-term consequences.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1444-1465 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Europe - Asia Studies |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue number | 7 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sep 2013 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Geography, Planning and Development
- Economics and Econometrics
- Sociology and Political Science
- History
Cite this
Controlling Immigration Manually : Lessons from Moscow (Russia). / Schenk, Caress.
In: Europe - Asia Studies, Vol. 65, No. 7, 09.2013, p. 1444-1465.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Controlling Immigration Manually
T2 - Lessons from Moscow (Russia)
AU - Schenk, Caress
PY - 2013/9
Y1 - 2013/9
N2 - In 2007, the Russian government instituted quotas for immigrant work permits that were consistently lower than actual labour demand. While low quotas are politically popular on the mass level, this article argues that low quotas are also a tool of the government to distribute patronage resources to regional political and economic elites. For several years after quotas were instituted, they remained quite controversial, and during this time decisions about them were firmly in the hands of Vladimir Putin, first as president and then as prime minister, giving him a powerful tool to control the immigration process and labour market manually. While this type of manual control is effective in the short term to manage contentious policy arenas, it suffers a number of possible long-term consequences.
AB - In 2007, the Russian government instituted quotas for immigrant work permits that were consistently lower than actual labour demand. While low quotas are politically popular on the mass level, this article argues that low quotas are also a tool of the government to distribute patronage resources to regional political and economic elites. For several years after quotas were instituted, they remained quite controversial, and during this time decisions about them were firmly in the hands of Vladimir Putin, first as president and then as prime minister, giving him a powerful tool to control the immigration process and labour market manually. While this type of manual control is effective in the short term to manage contentious policy arenas, it suffers a number of possible long-term consequences.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84887968152&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09668136.2013.824242
DO - 10.1080/09668136.2013.824242
M3 - Article
VL - 65
SP - 1444
EP - 1465
JO - Europe-Asia Studies
JF - Europe-Asia Studies
SN - 0966-8136
IS - 7
ER -