Abstract
Building on A. J. Robson (1990, J. Theoret. Biol. 144, 379-396), we introduce into the repeated prisoners' dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the "secret handshake," before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent. We show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit, cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time. Using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities, we obtain similar results. Surprisingly, in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D60.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 216-242 |
| Number of pages | 27 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2001 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Finance
Cite this
Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma. / Wiseman, Thomas; Yilankaya, Okan.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2001, p. 216-242.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma
AU - Wiseman, Thomas
AU - Yilankaya, Okan
PY - 2001
Y1 - 2001
N2 - Building on A. J. Robson (1990, J. Theoret. Biol. 144, 379-396), we introduce into the repeated prisoners' dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the "secret handshake," before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent. We show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit, cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time. Using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities, we obtain similar results. Surprisingly, in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D60.
AB - Building on A. J. Robson (1990, J. Theoret. Biol. 144, 379-396), we introduce into the repeated prisoners' dilemma mutants who have the ability to send a (costly) signal, i.e., the "secret handshake," before each round of the game and to condition their actions on whether or not they observe the same signal from their opponent. We show that as mutation probabilities approach zero in the limit, cooperation occurs a positive fraction of the time. Using simulations to study the behavior of the system with nonzero mutation probabilities, we obtain similar results. Surprisingly, in some cases an increased payoff to unilateral defection actually raises the level of cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, D60.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035189639&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035189639&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/game.2000.0836
DO - 10.1006/game.2000.0836
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035189639
VL - 37
SP - 216
EP - 242
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 1
ER -