In this paper, we investigate a disaster management system using D2D cooperative communications. Specifically, we consider two D2D cells, one is in healthy area and the other is in disaster area, where a user equipment (UE) in healthy area aims to assist a UE in the disaster area to recover wireless information transfer (WIT) via an energy harvesting (EH) relay. In the healthy area, a cellular base station (BS) shares the spectrum with the UE even though they may belong to different service providers. In return, this UE will have to provide some incentives to the BS by paying prices for causing interference and for trading energy. We formulate these processes as two Stackelberg games, interference pricing and energy trading, where their Stackelberg equilibriums are derived in closed-form solutions. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes. It is shown that the energy trading scheme outperforms the interference pricing scheme in terms of assistance efficiency for the disaster area.