Dynamics in legislative budgeting in Italy: 1982–2001

Carolyn Forestiere, Riccardo Pelizzo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

For much of the First Republic, the Italian parliament was notorious for its fiscal irresponsibility. However, using data over a 20-year period we note that the performance of the parliament during the passage of the national budget changed over time. During most of the 1980s the parliament always spent more than the final amount specified in the government's Budget Bill. But this trend slowed towards the late 1980s, and of particular interest is that for several years during the 1990s the parliament actually voted to spend less than the government had originally proposed. We explain this anomaly using institutional theories and contextual explanations.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)279-296
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Legislative Studies
Volume14
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2008

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Law

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