Abstract
by the strategic conflict avoidance with the IR literature, this paper models and
tests the strategic interaction during a bargaining between two collective actors.
When the target state believes that the initiator or the leader of the initiating state is domestically troubled, the target would accommodate the initiator's hostile demand in order not to be played in the initiator's hand. We design a lab experiment that captures the two-level nature of international crisis bargaining. We report the experimental evidence that decision-makers consider the domestic standing of the other decision maker as well as her own. The result confirms the strategic conflict avoidance that the reciprocating and retaliatory reaction becomes less popular as the responder's domestic standing improves, and that the conceding and forgiving behavior are more likely as the aggressor's domestic standing deteriorates.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Journal of Experimental Political Science |
| Publication status | Submitted - 2018 |
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I Won't Play Into Your Hands : A lab experiment of strategic interaction. / Koh, Hoyoun.
In: Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2018.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - I Won't Play Into Your Hands
T2 - A lab experiment of strategic interaction
AU - Koh, Hoyoun
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Why do some countries choose to retaliate, while others back down? Motivatedby the strategic conflict avoidance with the IR literature, this paper models andtests the strategic interaction during a bargaining between two collective actors.When the target state believes that the initiator or the leader of the initiating state is domestically troubled, the target would accommodate the initiator's hostile demand in order not to be played in the initiator's hand. We design a lab experiment that captures the two-level nature of international crisis bargaining. We report the experimental evidence that decision-makers consider the domestic standing of the other decision maker as well as her own. The result confirms the strategic conflict avoidance that the reciprocating and retaliatory reaction becomes less popular as the responder's domestic standing improves, and that the conceding and forgiving behavior are more likely as the aggressor's domestic standing deteriorates.
AB - Why do some countries choose to retaliate, while others back down? Motivatedby the strategic conflict avoidance with the IR literature, this paper models andtests the strategic interaction during a bargaining between two collective actors.When the target state believes that the initiator or the leader of the initiating state is domestically troubled, the target would accommodate the initiator's hostile demand in order not to be played in the initiator's hand. We design a lab experiment that captures the two-level nature of international crisis bargaining. We report the experimental evidence that decision-makers consider the domestic standing of the other decision maker as well as her own. The result confirms the strategic conflict avoidance that the reciprocating and retaliatory reaction becomes less popular as the responder's domestic standing improves, and that the conceding and forgiving behavior are more likely as the aggressor's domestic standing deteriorates.
M3 - Article
JO - Journal of Experimental Political Science
JF - Journal of Experimental Political Science
SN - 2052-2630
ER -