In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights

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1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner's version of that theory. He has argued that Will Theory must either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be incomplete, because it has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I show that both charges are problematic. They rely on some of Steiner's inferences which are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of Hohfeld's terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it assumes that the problems with Steiner's theory affect Will Theory in general.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)321-331
Number of pages11
JournalRes Publica
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 11 2012

Keywords

  • Analysis of rights
  • Hillel Steiner
  • Hohfeld
  • Legal rights
  • Moral rights
  • Nicholas Vrousalis
  • Theories of rights

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Law

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