Abstract
Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner's version of that theory. He has argued that Will Theory must either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be incomplete, because it has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I show that both charges are problematic. They rely on some of Steiner's inferences which are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of Hohfeld's terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it assumes that the problems with Steiner's theory affect Will Theory in general.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 321-331 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Res Publica |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2012 |
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Keywords
- Analysis of rights
- Hillel Steiner
- Hohfeld
- Legal rights
- Moral rights
- Nicholas Vrousalis
- Theories of rights
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Law
- Philosophy
Cite this
In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights. / van Duffel, Siegfried.
In: Res Publica, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2012, p. 321-331.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights
AU - van Duffel, Siegfried
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner's version of that theory. He has argued that Will Theory must either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be incomplete, because it has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I show that both charges are problematic. They rely on some of Steiner's inferences which are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of Hohfeld's terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it assumes that the problems with Steiner's theory affect Will Theory in general.
AB - Nicholas Vrousalis has aimed to recast an old objection to the will theory of rights by focusing on Hillel Steiner's version of that theory. He has argued that Will Theory must either be insensitive to the (values of the) lives of the unempowerable, or be incomplete, because it has no argumentative resources within its conceptual apparatus to ascribe or justify restrictions on the amount of discretion exercised by legal officials. I show that both charges are problematic. They rely on some of Steiner's inferences which are simply unjustified because they are based on misinterpretations of the logic of Hohfeld's terminology. The problem for Vrousalis is that his critique takes for granted some of these flawed arguments. The critique is also misdirected to the extent that it assumes that the problems with Steiner's theory affect Will Theory in general.
KW - Analysis of rights
KW - Hillel Steiner
KW - Hohfeld
KW - Legal rights
KW - Moral rights
KW - Nicholas Vrousalis
KW - Theories of rights
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84867479013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84867479013&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s11158-012-9193-3
DO - 10.1007/s11158-012-9193-3
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84867479013
VL - 18
SP - 321
EP - 331
JO - Res Publica
JF - Res Publica
SN - 1356-4765
IS - 4
ER -