Judicial independence and retention elections

Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark, Jee Kwang Park

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Judges face retention elections in over a third of US state courts of last resort and numerous lower courts. According to conventional wisdom, these elections engender judicial independence and decrease democratic accountability. We argue that in the context of modern judicial campaigns, retention elections create pressure for judges to cater to public opinion on "hot-button" issues that are salient to voters. Moreover, this pressure can be as great as that in contestable elections. We test these arguments by comparing decisions across systems with retention, partisan, and nonpartisan contestable elections. Employing models that account for judge- and state-specific effects, we analyze new data regarding abortion cases decided by state supreme courts between 1980 and 2006. The results provide strong evidence for the arguments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)211-234
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Volume28
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2012
Externally publishedYes

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election
election campaign
abortion
wisdom
public opinion
Supreme Court
responsibility
Judicial independence
Elections
evidence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Cite this

Judicial independence and retention elections. / Canes-Wrone, Brandice; Clark, Tom S.; Park, Jee Kwang.

In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 28, No. 2, 06.2012, p. 211-234.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Canes-Wrone, Brandice ; Clark, Tom S. ; Park, Jee Kwang. / Judicial independence and retention elections. In: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2012 ; Vol. 28, No. 2. pp. 211-234.
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