Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)149-168
Number of pages20
JournalNonproliferation Review
Volume21
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 3 2014
Externally publishedYes

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Kazakhstan
republic
president
decision making

Keywords

  • disarmament
  • Kazakhstan
  • nuclear weapons
  • Russia
  • Soviet Union
  • Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
  • United States

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92. / Ayazbekov, Anuar.

In: Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 03.04.2014, p. 149-168.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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