Abstract
This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 149-168 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Nonproliferation Review |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 3 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- disarmament
- Kazakhstan
- nuclear weapons
- Russia
- Soviet Union
- Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- United States
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92. / Ayazbekov, Anuar.
In: Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 03.04.2014, p. 149-168.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92
AU - Ayazbekov, Anuar
PY - 2014/4/3
Y1 - 2014/4/3
N2 - This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.
AB - This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.
KW - disarmament
KW - Kazakhstan
KW - nuclear weapons
KW - Russia
KW - Soviet Union
KW - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
KW - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
KW - United States
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84916244628&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84916244628&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/10736700.2014.962248
DO - 10.1080/10736700.2014.962248
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84916244628
VL - 21
SP - 149
EP - 168
JO - Nonproliferation Review
JF - Nonproliferation Review
SN - 1073-6700
IS - 2
ER -