Multiple Antennas Secure Transmission under Pilot Spoofing and Jamming Attack

Hui Ming Wang, Ke Wen Huang, Theodoros Tsiftsis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Transmitter-side channel state information of the legitimate destination plays a critical role in physical layer secure transmissions. However, channel training procedure is vulnerable to the pilot spoofing attack (PSA) or pilot jamming attack (PJA) by an active eavesdropper (Eve), which inevitably results in severe private information leakage. In this paper, we propose a random channel training (RCT)-based secure downlink transmission framework for a time division duplex multiple antennas base station. In the proposed RCT scheme, multiple orthogonal pilot sequences (PSs) are simultaneously allocated to the legitimate user (LU), and the LU randomly selects one PS from the assigned PS set to transmit. Under either the PSA or PJA, we provide the detailed steps for the BS to identify the PS transmitted by the LU, and to simultaneously estimate channels of the LU and Eve. The probability that the BS makes an incorrect decision on the PS of the LU is analytically investigated. Finally, closed-form secure beamforming vectors are designed and optimized to enhance the secrecy rates during the downlink transmissions. Numerical results show that the secrecy performance is greatly improved compared to the conventional channel training scheme wherein only one PS is assigned to the LU.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)860-876
Number of pages17
JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume36
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2018

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • channel estimation
  • jamming attack
  • Physical layer security
  • pilot spoofing attack
  • secure transmission

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this