TY - JOUR
T1 - Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
AU - Ely, Jeffrey C.
AU - Yilankaya, Okan
N1 - Funding Information:
1We thank (but exonerate) Eddie Dekel, who contributed substantially to the ideas in this paper. We also thank an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. 2Financial support from NSF Grant 9810787 is gratefully acknowledged. 3Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
Funding Information:
Our criterion for evolutionary stability of preferences has the usual two components: natural selection, the process by which unsuccessful types are replaced by successful types, and mutation, the process by which previously unrepresented types can enter the population. Roughly, an outcome x # 2 is supported by stable preferences if the preferences which support the outcome are stable under natural selection, and robust to mutation. We discuss these features in the present section.
PY - 2001/4
Y1 - 2001/4
N2 - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
AB - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
DO - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035315254
VL - 97
SP - 255
EP - 272
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 2
ER -