Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

Jeffrey C. Ely, Okan Yilankaya

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

40 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-272
Number of pages18
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume97
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2001
Externally publishedYes

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Evolution of preferences
Nash equilibrium
Fitness
Economics
Perfect equilibrium
Evolutionary processes
Normal form games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences. / Ely, Jeffrey C.; Yilankaya, Okan.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 97, No. 2, 04.2001, p. 255-272.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ely, Jeffrey C. ; Yilankaya, Okan. / Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2001 ; Vol. 97, No. 2. pp. 255-272.
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