Abstract
A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 255-272 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 97 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 2001 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences. / Ely, Jeffrey C.; Yilankaya, Okan.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 97, No. 2, 04.2001, p. 255-272.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
AU - Ely, Jeffrey C.
AU - Yilankaya, Okan
PY - 2001/4
Y1 - 2001/4
N2 - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
AB - A population of players is randomly matched to play a normal form game G. The payoffs in this game represent the fitness associated with the various outcomes. Each individual has preferences over the outcomes of the game and chooses an optimal action with respect to those preferences. However, these preferences need not coincide with the fitness payoffs. When evolution selects individuals on the basis of the fitness of the actions they take, the distribution of aggregate play must be a Nash equilibrium of G. Weak additional assumptions on the evolutionary process imply perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035315254&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035315254&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
DO - 10.1006/jeth.2000.2735
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035315254
VL - 97
SP - 255
EP - 272
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 2
ER -