TY - JOUR
T1 - Neo-patrimonialism and Corruption
T2 - Evidence from 8,436 Firms in 17 Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
AU - Araral, Eduardo
AU - Pak, Anton
AU - Pelizzo, Riccardo
AU - Wu, Xun
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the editors, three anonymous reviewers, and Adam Graham for their valuable comments and suggestions. This research was supported by the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by The American Society for Public Administration
Copyright:
Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/7/1
Y1 - 2019/7/1
N2 - This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs a neo-patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the literature. Second, unlike cross-country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional literature, the article uses large-n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo-patrimonialism has a strong, positive, and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.
AB - This article introduces four innovations to the literature on administrative corruption. First, it employs a neo-patrimonialism framework by addressing measurement, identification, and endogeneity issues that beset the literature. Second, unlike cross-country studies, it uses firms as the unit of analysis. Third, unlike the conventional literature, the article uses large-n (n = 8,436) panel survey data of key informants in 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, unlike the conventional literature, the article focuses on a particular type of corruption: the supply and demand for bribery. The authors find that the uncertainty associated with neo-patrimonialism has a strong, positive, and significant effect on the propensity of civil servants to demand bribes in exchange for services and for firms to supply bribes in exchange for winning government contracts. The results are robust to controls on the characteristics of firms and their regulatory environments. The article concludes with implications for research and practice.
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U2 - 10.1111/puar.13023
DO - 10.1111/puar.13023
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85060611012
SN - 0033-3352
VL - 79
SP - 580
EP - 590
JO - Public Administration Review
JF - Public Administration Review
IS - 4
ER -
