Objective truth in matters of taste

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1755-1777
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume173
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 1 2016
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Faultless Disagreement
Truth Value
Relativist
Fun
Contextualism
Bivalence
Personal Taste
Intuition
Relativism
Resources
Logic

Keywords

  • Contextualism
  • Disagreement
  • Linguistic intuitions
  • Natural language semantics
  • Relativism
  • Truth values

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Objective truth in matters of taste. / Capraru, Mihnea D I.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 173, No. 7, 01.07.2016, p. 1755-1777.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Capraru, Mihnea D I. / Objective truth in matters of taste. In: Philosophical Studies. 2016 ; Vol. 173, No. 7. pp. 1755-1777.
@article{b263e23c33b448e18fa419181c00d6e7,
title = "Objective truth in matters of taste",
abstract = "In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.",
keywords = "Contextualism, Disagreement, Linguistic intuitions, Natural language semantics, Relativism, Truth values",
author = "Capraru, {Mihnea D I}",
year = "2016",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11098-015-0577-z",
language = "English",
volume = "173",
pages = "1755--1777",
journal = "Philosophical Studies",
issn = "0031-8116",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "7",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Objective truth in matters of taste

AU - Capraru, Mihnea D I

PY - 2016/7/1

Y1 - 2016/7/1

N2 - In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.

AB - In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. To this end the article describes and advocates a contextualist solution inspired by supervaluationist truth-value gap approaches. The solution presented here, however, does not require truth value gaps; it preserves both logical bivalence and non-relative truth, even while it acknowledges and explains the possibility of faultless disagreement. The solution is motivated by the correlation between assertions’ being true and their being useful. This correlation, furthermore, is used not only to tell which assertions are true, but also to determine which linguistic intuitions are reliable.

KW - Contextualism

KW - Disagreement

KW - Linguistic intuitions

KW - Natural language semantics

KW - Relativism

KW - Truth values

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84945537703&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84945537703&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11098-015-0577-z

DO - 10.1007/s11098-015-0577-z

M3 - Article

VL - 173

SP - 1755

EP - 1777

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

SN - 0031-8116

IS - 7

ER -