Abstract
We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 866-877 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 150 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Incomplete information
- Potential
- Robustness
- Team-maximin equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics