Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Vladyslav Nora, Hiroshi Uno

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)866-877
Number of pages12
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume150
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes

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Best response
Incomplete information
Correlated equilibrium
Robustness
Maximin

Keywords

  • Incomplete information
  • Potential
  • Robustness
  • Team-maximin equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria. / Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 150, No. 1, 2014, p. 866-877.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Nora, Vladyslav ; Uno, Hiroshi. / Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2014 ; Vol. 150, No. 1. pp. 866-877.
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