Abstract
We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 866-877 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 150 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
Keywords
- Incomplete information
- Potential
- Robustness
- Team-maximin equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria. / Nora, Vladyslav; Uno, Hiroshi.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 150, No. 1, 2014, p. 866-877.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria
AU - Nora, Vladyslav
AU - Uno, Hiroshi
PY - 2014
Y1 - 2014
N2 - We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.
AB - We provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997) [11], Morris and Ui (2005) [15]. The condition is formulated for games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real-valued function on the set of action profiles such that there is a single player for whom minimizing the function implies choosing her best response, and for the other players maximizing the function implies choosing their best responses. In a game with a saddle function the set of correlated equilibria that induce an expectation of the saddle function greater or equal to its maximin value is robust to incomplete information.
KW - Incomplete information
KW - Potential
KW - Robustness
KW - Team-maximin equilibrium
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84894265489&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84894265489&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84894265489
VL - 150
SP - 866
EP - 877
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -