Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games

Hamed Kebriei; Behrouz Maham; Dusit Niyato

doi:10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games

Hamed Kebriei, Behrouz Maham, Dusit Niyato

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a cellular based primary network coexisting with a secondary network. The primary network consists of multiple service providers (SP) and there are several independent users in the secondary network. The SP are operating on the different frequency spectrum and a group of secondary users intend to share these spectrum with the primary services. This situation is formulated as a bandwidth auction game where each user bids a demand curve and each SP offers a supply curve. We consider two cases of complete information case and incomplete information case or learning games. For two cases, we derive the optimal strategies of the players and the distributed algorithms are presented to obtain the solution of these dynamic games.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1608-1613
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781479930838
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450
Publication status	Published - Nov 10 2014
Event	2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: Apr 6 2014 → Apr 9 2014

Publication series

Name	IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC
ISSN (Print)	1525-3511

Other

Other	2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014
Country	Turkey
City	Istanbul
Period	4/6/14 → 4/9/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Engineering(all)

Access to Document

10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

Kebriei, H., Maham, B., & Niyato, D. (2014). Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games. In IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC (pp. 1608-1613). [6952450] (IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games. / Kebriei, Hamed; Maham, Behrouz; Niyato, Dusit.

IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2014. p. 1608-1613 6952450 (IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Kebriei, H, Maham, B & Niyato, D 2014, Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games. in IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC., 6952450, IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1608-1613, 2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014, Istanbul, Turkey, 4/6/14. https://doi.org/10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

@inproceedings{4d5911e779f14061ac35e2daffb9ffae,

title = "Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games",

abstract = "In this paper, we consider a cellular based primary network coexisting with a secondary network. The primary network consists of multiple service providers (SP) and there are several independent users in the secondary network. The SP are operating on the different frequency spectrum and a group of secondary users intend to share these spectrum with the primary services. This situation is formulated as a bandwidth auction game where each user bids a demand curve and each SP offers a supply curve. We consider two cases of complete information case and incomplete information case or learning games. For two cases, we derive the optimal strategies of the players and the distributed algorithms are presented to obtain the solution of these dynamic games.",

author = "Hamed Kebriei and Behrouz Maham and Dusit Niyato",

year = "2014",

month = nov,

day = "10",

doi = "10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450",

language = "English",

series = "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

pages = "1608--1613",

booktitle = "IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC",

address = "United States",

note = "2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014 ; Conference date: 06-04-2014 Through 09-04-2014",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Supply-demand function equilibrium for double sided bandwidth-auction games

AU - Kebriei, Hamed

AU - Maham, Behrouz

AU - Niyato, Dusit

PY - 2014/11/10

Y1 - 2014/11/10

N2 - In this paper, we consider a cellular based primary network coexisting with a secondary network. The primary network consists of multiple service providers (SP) and there are several independent users in the secondary network. The SP are operating on the different frequency spectrum and a group of secondary users intend to share these spectrum with the primary services. This situation is formulated as a bandwidth auction game where each user bids a demand curve and each SP offers a supply curve. We consider two cases of complete information case and incomplete information case or learning games. For two cases, we derive the optimal strategies of the players and the distributed algorithms are presented to obtain the solution of these dynamic games.

AB - In this paper, we consider a cellular based primary network coexisting with a secondary network. The primary network consists of multiple service providers (SP) and there are several independent users in the secondary network. The SP are operating on the different frequency spectrum and a group of secondary users intend to share these spectrum with the primary services. This situation is formulated as a bandwidth auction game where each user bids a demand curve and each SP offers a supply curve. We consider two cases of complete information case and incomplete information case or learning games. For two cases, we derive the optimal strategies of the players and the distributed algorithms are presented to obtain the solution of these dynamic games.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84912120110&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84912120110&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

DO - 10.1109/WCNC.2014.6952450

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84912120110

T3 - IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC

SP - 1608

EP - 1613

BT - IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 2014 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, WCNC 2014

Y2 - 6 April 2014 through 9 April 2014

ER -