TY - JOUR
T1 - Suspiciously timed trade disputes
AU - Conconi, Paola
AU - DeRemer, David R.
AU - Kirchsteiger, Georg
AU - Trimarchi, Lorenzo
AU - Zanardi, Maurizio
PY - 2017/3/1
Y1 - 2017/3/1
N2 - This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.
AB - This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.
KW - Elections
KW - Reciprocity
KW - Trade disputes
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007490567&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85007490567&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
DO - 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85007490567
VL - 105
SP - 57
EP - 76
JO - Journal of International Economics
JF - Journal of International Economics
SN - 0022-1996
ER -