Suspiciously timed trade disputes: How politics influences WTO enforcement

David De Remer, Paola Conconi (Photographer), Lorenzo Trimarchi (Photographer), Georg Kirchsteiger (Photographer), Maurizio Zanardi (Photographer)

Research output: Non-textual formWeb publication/site


Economic cycles patently influence politics. This column explores an unexplored avenue of political economy research by assessing whether US politicians file international trade disputes to win votes. It turns out they do. This means that disputes might be brought earlier or later than they otherwise would – potentially costing lots more than they should – and that violations in industries that are deemed unimportant by electioneering politicians go unpunished.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherVoxEU CEPR Policy Portal
Media of outputOnline
Publication statusPublished - Jun 15 2015
Externally publishedYes


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