The Cartel Party and the Italian Case

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cartel party literature has generated three lines of research investigating the transformation of party organizations, the party system, and policy output. The third line of research, which could be defined as the political economy of the cartel party, has shown that party systems resemble oligopolistic markets in two respects: the policy output has changed and voters have the impression that changes in political supply did not represent adjustments to the transformation of voters' demands. Yet literature on this subject has not provided any evidence to sustain the claim that parties' behavior resembles the behavior of oligopolistic firms in a cartel. The purpose of the present article is to show that the legislative behavior of Italian parties gives the impression that Italian parties are engaged in collusive practices and that, for this reason, it is appropriate to regard the Italian party system not only as oligopolistic but also as a cartel.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)474-498
Number of pages25
JournalPolitics and Policy
Volume36
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

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cartel
party system
party organization
political economy
supply
firm
market
evidence
literature

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

The Cartel Party and the Italian Case. / Pelizzo, Riccardo.

In: Politics and Policy, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2008, p. 474-498.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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