The nature of rights debate rests on a mistake

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The recent debate over the nature of rights has been dominated by two rival theories of rights. Proponents of the Will Theory of rights hold that individual freedom, autonomy, control, or sovereignty are somehow to be fundamental to the concept of a right, while proponents of the Interest Theory argue that rights rather protect people's welfare. Participants in this debate commonly assume the existence of a single 'concept' of which both theories provide competing descriptions. The aim of this article is to show that both accounts are better understood as providing characterizations of different 'kinds' of rights.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)104-123
Number of pages20
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume93
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2012
Externally publishedYes

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Mistakes
Autonomy
Individual Freedoms
Sovereignty
Rivals
Fundamental

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

The nature of rights debate rests on a mistake. / Van Duffel, Siegfried.

In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 93, No. 1, 03.2012, p. 104-123.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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