Abstract
I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 263-272 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | South African Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 3 2019 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
Virtuous testimonial belief in young children. / Ryan, Shane.
In: South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 3, 03.07.2019, p. 263-272.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Virtuous testimonial belief in young children
AU - Ryan, Shane
PY - 2019/7/3
Y1 - 2019/7/3
N2 - I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.
AB - I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073195625&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85073195625&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122
DO - 10.1080/02580136.2019.1648122
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85073195625
VL - 38
SP - 263
EP - 272
JO - South African Journal of Philosophy
JF - South African Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0258-0136
IS - 3
ER -