Virtuous testimonial belief in young children

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-272
Number of pages10
JournalSouth African Journal of Philosophy
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Jul 3 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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