Virtuous testimonial belief in young children

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I lay out the challenge posed by testimonial knowledge in young children to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. In particular, I examine accounts from Greco and Pritchard and argue that those accounts are too demanding. More specifically, I make the case that young children can have testimonial knowledge without meeting the ability requirements claimed by Greco and Pritchard. As a virtue theoretic alternative, I argue that an agent’s belief must be epistemically virtuous, but that this may sometimes involve belief from a trait rather than an ability.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)263-272
Number of pages10
JournalSouth African Journal of Philosophy
Volume38
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 3 2019

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Virtuous testimonial belief in young children. / Ryan, Shane.

In: South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 3, 03.07.2019, p. 263-272.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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