We don’t know we don’t know

asserting ignorance

Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi, Ciro De Florio, Ahti Veikko Pietarinen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.

Original languageEnglish
JournalSynthese
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2019

Fingerprint

pragmatics
Ignorance

Keywords

  • Assertion
  • Ignorance
  • Pragmatic logic
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

We don’t know we don’t know : asserting ignorance. / Carrara, Massimiliano; Chiffi, Daniele; De Florio, Ciro; Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko.

In: Synthese, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Carrara, Massimiliano ; Chiffi, Daniele ; De Florio, Ciro ; Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko. / We don’t know we don’t know : asserting ignorance. In: Synthese. 2019.
@article{99e5f6513c6342e39463e9db0897e00a,
title = "We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance",
abstract = "The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.",
keywords = "Assertion, Ignorance, Pragmatic logic, Uncertainty",
author = "Massimiliano Carrara and Daniele Chiffi and {De Florio}, Ciro and Pietarinen, {Ahti Veikko}",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y",
language = "English",
journal = "Synthese",
issn = "0039-7857",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - We don’t know we don’t know

T2 - asserting ignorance

AU - Carrara, Massimiliano

AU - Chiffi, Daniele

AU - De Florio, Ciro

AU - Pietarinen, Ahti Veikko

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.

AB - The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.

KW - Assertion

KW - Ignorance

KW - Pragmatic logic

KW - Uncertainty

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068335882&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85068335882&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y

DO - 10.1007/s11229-019-02300-y

M3 - Article

JO - Synthese

JF - Synthese

SN - 0039-7857

ER -