What makes Public Accounts Committees work? a comparative analysis

Riccardo Pelizzo, Rick Stapenhurst, Vinod Sahgal, William Woodley

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committee members, on the availability of independent sources of information, and on the media’s interest in scrutinizing government accounts.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)774-793
Number of pages20
JournalPolitics and Policy
Volume34
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2006
Externally publishedYes

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World Bank
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performance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

What makes Public Accounts Committees work? a comparative analysis. / Pelizzo, Riccardo; Stapenhurst, Rick; Sahgal, Vinod; Woodley, William.

In: Politics and Policy, Vol. 34, No. 4, 01.01.2006, p. 774-793.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Pelizzo, Riccardo ; Stapenhurst, Rick ; Sahgal, Vinod ; Woodley, William. / What makes Public Accounts Committees work? a comparative analysis. In: Politics and Policy. 2006 ; Vol. 34, No. 4. pp. 774-793.
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