Abstract
This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committee members, on the availability of independent sources of information, and on the media’s interest in scrutinizing government accounts.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 774-793 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Politics and Policy |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2006 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
Cite this
What makes Public Accounts Committees work? a comparative analysis. / Pelizzo, Riccardo; Stapenhurst, Rick; Sahgal, Vinod; Woodley, William.
In: Politics and Policy, Vol. 34, No. 4, 01.01.2006, p. 774-793.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - What makes Public Accounts Committees work? a comparative analysis
AU - Pelizzo, Riccardo
AU - Stapenhurst, Rick
AU - Sahgal, Vinod
AU - Woodley, William
PY - 2006/1/1
Y1 - 2006/1/1
N2 - This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committee members, on the availability of independent sources of information, and on the media’s interest in scrutinizing government accounts.
AB - This article investigates whether and under what conditions Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are able to scrutinize government accounts. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. We find that the relationship between the formal powers of the PACs and their successful performance is conditional. Specifically, we argue that the success of PACs depend on the behavior of committee members, on the availability of independent sources of information, and on the media’s interest in scrutinizing government accounts.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=43249179290&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00040.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2006.00040.x
M3 - Article
VL - 34
SP - 774
EP - 793
JO - Politics and Policy
JF - Politics and Policy
SN - 1555-5623
IS - 4
ER -