TY - JOUR
T1 - When Certainty Backfires: The Effects of Unwarranted Precision on Consumer Loyalty
AU - Batteux, Eleonore
AU - Khon, Zarema
AU - Bilovich, Avri
AU - Johnson, Samuel G.B.
AU - Tuckett, David
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Consumers are drawn to the promise of certainty that precise forecasts seem to provide, even though they are often misleading. Yet we know less about how consumers respond when precise forecasts prove inaccurate. In this paper, we investigate how inaccurate precise compared to range forecasts affect consumer judgments and decisions over time in an investment context. Specifically, we assess how they affect consumers' loyalty towards the forecaster as well as their willingness to make the same kind of investment again. Consumers were less trusting of and loyal to investment management firms that communicated inaccurate precise forecasts compared to firms that communicated inaccurate range forecasts, which acknowledged uncertainty. But we did not find evidence that consumers changed their minds as to the sector into which they wanted to invest. In other words, they seem to punish the firm for inaccurate forecasts, but this did not shift their preference for their type of investment. Interestingly, these effects largely persisted when consumers encountered similar inaccurate forecasts 1 week later, suggesting they do not learn to be suspicious of precise forecasts in general from exposure to inaccurate forecasts. Overall, our findings show that it is not in firms' interest to communicate overly precise forecasts under uncertainty as they risk punishment by consumers.
AB - Consumers are drawn to the promise of certainty that precise forecasts seem to provide, even though they are often misleading. Yet we know less about how consumers respond when precise forecasts prove inaccurate. In this paper, we investigate how inaccurate precise compared to range forecasts affect consumer judgments and decisions over time in an investment context. Specifically, we assess how they affect consumers' loyalty towards the forecaster as well as their willingness to make the same kind of investment again. Consumers were less trusting of and loyal to investment management firms that communicated inaccurate precise forecasts compared to firms that communicated inaccurate range forecasts, which acknowledged uncertainty. But we did not find evidence that consumers changed their minds as to the sector into which they wanted to invest. In other words, they seem to punish the firm for inaccurate forecasts, but this did not shift their preference for their type of investment. Interestingly, these effects largely persisted when consumers encountered similar inaccurate forecasts 1 week later, suggesting they do not learn to be suspicious of precise forecasts in general from exposure to inaccurate forecasts. Overall, our findings show that it is not in firms' interest to communicate overly precise forecasts under uncertainty as they risk punishment by consumers.
M3 - Article
SN - 0894-3257
JO - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
JF - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
ER -