Abstract
I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 249-269 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Philosophy |
| Volume | 92 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Apr 1 2017 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy
Cite this
Why knowledge is special. / Ryan, Shane.
In: Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 2, 01.04.2017, p. 249-269.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Why knowledge is special
AU - Ryan, Shane
PY - 2017/4/1
Y1 - 2017/4/1
N2 - I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.
AB - I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85009799966&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0031819116000668
DO - 10.1017/S0031819116000668
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85009799966
VL - 92
SP - 249
EP - 269
JO - Philosophy
JF - Philosophy
SN - 0031-8191
IS - 2
ER -