Why knowledge is special

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)249-269
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophy
Volume92
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2017

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Value of Knowledge
Responsiveness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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Why knowledge is special. / Ryan, Shane.

In: Philosophy, Vol. 92, No. 2, 01.04.2017, p. 249-269.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Ryan, Shane. / Why knowledge is special. In: Philosophy. 2017 ; Vol. 92, No. 2. pp. 249-269.
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