Abstract
I argue against Greco's account of the value of knowledge, according to which knowledge is distinctively valuable vis-à-vis that which falls short of knowledge in virtue of its status as an achievement and achievements being finally valuable. Instead, I make the case that virtuous belief is also an achievement. I argue that the nature of knowledge is such that knowledge is finally valuable in a way that virtuous belief is not, precisely because knowledge is not simply a success from ability. The value of knowledge lies in the positive responsiveness of the world to an agent's epistemic virtuousness.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 249-269 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Philosophy |
Volume | 92 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 1 2017 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy